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Abstract: This paper examines the incentive to adopt a new technology resulting
from common payment systems, namely mixed cost reimbursement and DRG
reimbursement. Adoption is based on a cost–benefit criterion. We find that retro-
spective payment systems require a large enough patient benefit to yield adoption,
while under DRG-linked payment, adoption may arise in the absence of patients
benefits when the differential reimbursement for the old vs new technology is
large enough. Also, mixed cost reimbursement leads to higher adoption under
conditions on the differential reimbursement levels and patient benefits. In policy
terms, mixed cost reimbursement system may be more effective than a DRG
payment system to induce technology adoption. Our analysis also shows that
current economic evaluation criteria for new technologies do not capture the
different ways payment systems influence technology adoption. This gives a
new dimension to the discussion of prospective vs retrospective payment systems
of the last decades centered on the debate of quality vs cost containment.
Keywords: healthcare, technology adoption, reimbursement systems
JEL Classification: I11, I12
DOI 10.1515/bejeap-2014-0113
1 Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed an increasing share of the level of spending on
health care relative to the GDP (see OECD 2005a, 2005b). There is a general
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consensus that technological development (and diffusion) is a prime driver of
this phenomenon. The recent account by Smith, Newhouse, and Freeland (2009)
estimates that medical technology explains a fraction of between 27–48%
(depending on different estimation techniques) of growth in the US health
spending in the period 1960–2007. Despite the relatively large literature docu-
menting empirically the impact of innovation in health care, a theoretical corpus
has not been fully developed yet. In this paper we address a particular issue: the
relationship between payment systems and the rate of technology adoption. To
avoid unnecessary confusion, let us point out that we refer to adoption as the
decision of a provider to acquire a piece of new technology available. We do not
consider the process by which such a new technology has become available, nor
the R&D involved in it, nor any other considerations. Neither we consider the
issue of diffusion of a new technology. Our departing point is that a new way to
provide some treatment has become available, and thus providers must decide
whether to acquire it. An illustrative example of the situation we have in mind is
the adoption of the laser technology in ophthalmology.
We contribute to the theoretical literature by setting up a model of uncertain
demand, where the novelty lies in relating the technological shift to the
increased benefit for patients, financial variables, and the reimbursement sys-
tem to providers. We seek to assess the impact of the payment system to
providers on the rate of technology adoption. We propose two payment
schemes, a reimbursement according to the cost of treating patients, and a
DRG payment system where the new technology may or may not be reimbursed
differently from the old technology. We find that under a mixed cost reimburse-
ment system, large enough patient benefits are necessary for adoption to occur.
However, when the DRG offers a higher reimbursement for new technology,
adoption occurs even in the absence of patients’ benefits. In this case, the new
technology must be reimbursed sufficiently higher than the old one. Finally, to
compare the levels of technological adoption in the different payment regimes,
we take as reference an investment level yielding to the provider the same
marginal return of investment in new technology across regimes. Mixed cost
reimbursement leads to higher adoption of the new technology if the rate of
reimbursement is high relative to the margin of new vs old DRG. Having larger
patient benefits favors more adoption under the mixed cost reimbursement
payment system, provided that adoption occurs initially under both payment
systems. In policy terms, it may well be the case that for some objectives of the
regulator regarding the level of technological adoption, a retrospective payment
system to the providers is more effective than a prospective reimbursement
system. This opens again the discussion of prospective versus retrospective
payment systems in a wider framework than the debate of quality vs cost
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containment developed along the last decade. To evaluate the impact of the
adoption of new technology, we study how adjusting the parameters of the
payment function affect adoption for a given level of total expenditure. We use
this approach as a proxy for a welfare analysis of adoption, due to the inherent
difficulties in our model to define a social welfare function for the health
authority. We obtain that under risk neutrality, more mixed cost reimbursement
always increases adoption. More generally, risk aversion leads to ambiguity of
how the level of adoption adjusts to changes in the payment system.
In general, the main findings in the empirical literature can be grouped in
three related classes: (i) technological development induces an increase in
health care expenditures, (ii) the reimbursement system in the health care sector
has an impact on the R&D effort, and (iii) the R&D effort determines the type of
technological development, either brand new technology, or improvements in
existing technologies (or both).
Some of the main conclusions of this mainly empirical literature stress the
fact that (a) prospective payment systems encourage cost efficient new technol-
ogies but have perverse effects on quality improvement, and (b) retrospective
payment systems encourage quality but dim sensitivity toward cost efficiency.
Illustrative references include Di Tommaso and Schweitzer (2005), OECD
(2005c), Bodenheimer (2005), Duggan and Evans (2005), and Bokhari (2009).
Sorenson et al. (2014) report on the use of separate payments, supplemen-
tary payments, and cost-outlier funding to compensate the short-run lack of
information in the initial stages of the adoption of a new technology. These
payments are either additional funds or retrospective reimbursement of reported
costs beyond the DRG system. New technologies adopted must satisfy a set of
criteria for the hospital to receive the additional funds. Among them, (i) costs
exceeding standard deviation of the respective DRGs; (ii) apply the new technol-
ogy to a sufficiently large base of patients; and (iii) being more cost effective
compared with existing services. The review of experiences in Sorenson et al.
(2014) reveals that diversity exists, with different approaches being adopted
within the DRG-like payment framework. In some cases, a new DRG is created,
while in others extra payments are negotiated. The use of (negotiated) supple-
mental payments on top of DRG value to pay for innovation is close to what we
term below as mixed payment systems. These supplemental payments pay cover
fully or partially the cost of the innovation (for a review of the UK NHS
experience, see Sorenson, Drummond, and Wilkinson 2013). An illustration of
this diversity is provided by the diffusion of drug eluting stents in Italy during
the early 2000s, as described in Capellaro, Ghislandi, and Anessi-Pessina (2011):
the Italian health system is decentralized to the regional level and it introduced
an ad hoc DRG to accommodate the new technology in some regions while in
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others different extra payments in existing DRGs were adopted. They find that
hospitals funded by DRG had higher technology adoption than hospitals paid by
global budget (linked to the region’s capitation and not paying explicitly for
innovation).
The findings advanced in the empirical literature link health care expenditure
and technology diffusion based on a number of factors, including (i) the degree of
substitutability/complementarity between the old and new technologies, (ii) the
efficiency of the innovation in terms of effort reduction and output improvement,
(iii) the impact of expenses of the adoption of new technologies in accordance
with the treatment expansion and treatment substitution effects, (iv) the presence
of agents whose objective functions need not be profit maximization, and (v) the
characteristics of the health care system, its financing and regulation.
These and other elements determine the incentives to develop and diffuse
new medical technologies. However, there are very few theoretical models
providing support to the empirical modeling, and allowing for addressing the
incentives for technological development, the rate of its diffusion in the health
care system, or the welfare effects of the adoption of such (expensive) medical
innovations. Among those few contributions we find Goddeeris (1984a, 1984b),
Baumgardner (1991), and Selder (2005), who examine the effects of technical
innovation on the insurance market, and Miraldo (2007) who studies the feed-
back effects between the health care and the R&D sectors, Grebel and Wilfer
(2010) who study the diffusion of two competing technologies, and Levaggi,
Moretto, and Pertile (2010) who consider how the uncertainty on patients’
benefits affects the incentives to invest in new technologies.
There are several relevant topics that we do not address in our analysis. One
is the role of the malpractice system, with extra tests and procedures ordered in
response to the perceived threat of medical malpractice claims (Kessler and
McClellan 1996). On the effects of hospital competition on health care costs
see Kessler and McCellan (2000). Another topic is the use of technology assess-
ment criteria to measure the value of new health care technologies brought
about by R&D investments. Economic evaluation (cost–benefit analysis) of new
technologies is common in pharmaceutical innovation and has led to a wide
body of literature, both on methodological principles and on application to
specific products. For a recent view on the interaction between R&D and health
technology assessment criteria, see Philipson and Jena (2006).
Most of our analysis is set in the context of a health care sector organized
around a NHS. We do not explicitly account for a specific role of the private
sector in the provision of health care services as a driver in the adoption of new
available technologies. Our analysis is applicable to both private and public
sectors to the extent that they use the payment mechanisms we explore below.
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At this point of the analysis, we do not include strategic aspects related to the
adoption decision. Rather, we focus in the decision making of an isolated
hospital trading off costs and benefits given some popular reimbursement
schemes.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
behavioral assumptions. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the adoption decision of a
new technology under the different payment regimes. Section 5 compares the
levels of adoption across payment schemes. Section 6 studies whether the
different reimbursement regimes induce over- or under adoption with respect
to the first-best associated with the social welfare. A section with conclusions
and a technical appendix close the paper.
2 The model
We consider a semi-altruistic provider, who values financial results (represented
by an increasing and concave utility function, VðÞ;V 0ðÞ >0 and V 00ðÞ  0) and
patients’ health gains. We will refer to the hospital as an example of a relevant
provider throughout the text.
The potential population of patients is known (from say, epidemiological
studies). It is represented by qm. Also, these patients are homogeneous, i.e. they
all suffer from the same illness and with the same severity.1 The actual number
of patients treated by the hospital, q, is uncertain over the course of a time
period (say, a year). The hospital can install a new technology that allows it to
treat q^ patients. If demand for hospital services exceeds the newly installed
capacity, then patients are treated using an older technology. In other words, the
new technology is used prior to the old technology. We assume that within the
set of patients needing treatment no prioritization is made across patients.2
Uncertainty about demand for hospital services is modeled in a simple way as
distribution FðqÞ, with density f ðqÞ, in the domain ½0; qm.
The uncertainty on demand gives content to the problem. Should demand
be deterministic the hospital would know before hand the capacity to be used
1 Allowing for heterogeneous patients in terms of severity levels should not alter the qualitative
results as long as the increased benefits of the treatment offset the increased costs aggregately
(see below). No clear cut conclusions are to be expected otherwise, In particular, the distribu-
tion of severities over the population of patients (and thus of patients’ benefits) would be
crucial to assess the incentives for adoption of the new technology.
2 This is assumed for expositional simplicity. The problem remains basically the same within
each priority group if we allow for explicit prioritization of patients.
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with the new technology, and thus the decision to adopt would become trivial.
Also, the endogenous character of q^ leads us to assume that q^ is not contractible
(as in the literature). The specific way the hospital will use the new technology
depends on elements internal to the provider such as the clinical decision-
making. In this sense, the model can be interpreted as conveying private
information and the payer trying to induce socially optimal decisions through
the choice of the reimbursement system.
Adoption of a new technology is an investment decision in capacity to treat
patients, represented by a continuous endogenous variable q^. In this sense we
interpret the new technology in terms of the health care services it provides
rather than as a discrete decision on whether to adopt or not. Accordingly,
adoption in our context means an investment in capacity to treat patients with
a different protocol yielding higher benefits to them. Alternatively, we can think
of one decision, namely to adopt or not to adopt, and at the same time decide
the scale of the adoption. In this case, the new technology can be a (scalable)
equipment or training of health professionals in providing a new treatment.
Uncertainty is symmetric for the two technologies. In other words, we
assume the total number of patients is uncertain, not how many treatments
will be required with the new technology. Implicitly, this implies the new
technology represents a step forward in the development of the treatment rather
than a break through improvement.
Note that uncertainty over the actual number of patients induces uncertainty
over the use of the new technology (even though we assume it is used prior to
the old one, up to capacity), and thus over the financial result of the investment.
We capture this uncertainty by assuming a risk adverse behavior on the part of
the hospital. Also note that risk neutrality would imply that the marginal
valuation of the financial results of the hospital is independent of its level of
activity.
Finally, we also consider the patients’ benefits as the criterion for the use of
the new technology. Patients are treated with the new technology up to capacity,
and if there is demand left, it is treated with the old technology. This is a simple
mechanism that in our context of homogeneous patients is meaningful. More
general set-ups where patients are differentiated in severity allow for more
sophisticated mechanisms (see Siciliani 2006, and Hafsteinsdottir and Siciliani
2010 for the analysis of treatment selection mechanisms when patients differ in
severity).
Hospitals receive a payment transfer R. Such payment may be prospective,
retrospective, or mixed. We will analyze two payment systems. On the one hand,
we will study a mixed cost reimbursement scheme flexible enough to accom-
modate total mixed cost reimbursement, fixed fee/capitation, and partial mixed
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cost reimbursement. On the other hand, we look at the effects of a DRG-based
payment system with payments by sickness episode.3 We assume that the payer
can commit to the rule announced. Otherwise, “hold-up” issues à la Bös and de
Fraja (2002) could arise.
The new technology has an investment cost per patient treated of p.4 There
is also a constant marginal cost per patient treated, given by θ in the new
technology and by c in the old technology. Accordingly, the total cost is
composed of (i) the cost of installing the new technology allowing to treat up
to q^ patients given by pq^, and (ii) the cost of treatments. This in turn, depends on
whether realized demand is below capacity (in which case it is given by θq), or
whether realized demand is above capacity. Then, q^ patients are treated with the
new technology at marginal cost θ, and ðq q^Þ patients are treated under the
old technology with marginal cost c. Formally, the total cost function of the
hospital is given by,
TC ¼ pq^þ θq if q  q^
pq^þ θq^þ cðq q^Þ if q > q^

½1
We assume that the average and marginal costs of the new technology is higher
than the corresponding average and marginal costs of the old technology:
Assumption 1
pþ θ  c>0: ½2
With this assumption we capture the generally accepted claim that new tech-
nologies are not cost savers relative to existing ones and are one of the main
drivers of the cost inflation in the health care sectors in developed countries. Of
course, a technology with more benefits and lower costs poses no trade-off to
adoption decisions, in particular if the condition in Assumption 1 is reversed.
Note that the assumption allows marginal cost of treatment-only in the new
technology to be lower that in the old one (θ< c) without violating the
assumption.
3 Implicitly we define DRGs as describing processes and procedures. We have chosen this
approach instead of the alternative definition of DRGs capturing the casemix, as we find it more
suitable for our analysis.
4 This means that for the purposes of our main arguments we abstract from the potential
lumpiness of technological investment. Lumpiness can be easily accommodated by redefining
the units of measurement of patients.
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We abstract from explicitly considering fixed costs. As the optimal adoption
decision is made of marginal arguments, they do not play a role. Implicitly, we
are assuming that demand is large enough to cover for the fixed cost.
Patient benefits measured in monetary units are given by b^ under the new
technology and by b in the old technology. We assume b^> b; b^ > pþ θ and b> c,
so that it is socially desirable to provide treatment to patients. To ease notation,
hereafter let Δ; b^ b. That is Δ represents the incremental patients’ benefits
when treated with the new technology.
Economic evaluation criteria will often require that incremental benefits
from the new technology exceed incremental costs, that is:
Assumption 2 Economic evaluation criterion for approval of new technology
requires incremental benefits greater than incremental costs from the new technol-
ogy. That is,
Δ> pþ θ  c >0 ½3
Hereinafter, whenever we mention that economic evaluation criteria (or health
technology assessment) are used, we mean that incremental benefits are greater
than incremental costs (or equivalently Assumption 2 holds).5
The expected utility for the hospital decision maker is given by the valuation
of the financial results of the hospital and by valuation of patients’ benefits from
treatment.
U ¼
ðq^
0
VðR pq^ θqÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
VðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
þ η
ðq^
0
b^qf ðqÞdqþ η
ðqm
q^
ððq q^Þbþ q^b^Þf ðqÞdq
½4
This function captures a semi-altruistic provider who weights its private benefits
and the social benefits implicitly through the function V and the parameter η >0.
In particular, the financial result of the hospital is given by revenues R (that will
follow a pre-specified rule), minus the costs of treating patients. Costs of the
hospital have two components. First, the cost of installing the new technology
5 We assume new technologies that are both cost and benefit incremental. The relevant
assumption for adoption is that the increased benefits offset the increased cost. This allows to
extend in a parallel way new technologies that are both cost and benefit decreasing, under the
equivalent assumption that the decrease in benefits is lower that the decrease in cost.
Technologies associated to higher costs and lower benefits would never be adopted, while
new technologies with lower cost and higher benefits for the patients would always be adopted
regardless of the payment system.
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allowing to treat up to q^ patients. This is given by pq^, regardless of whether
demand exceeds or not, the capacity level of the new technology. Second, there
is the cost of actual treatments when realized demand is below the capacity built
for the new technology. This cost is θq. On the other hand, when realized
demand is above the capacity available for treatment under the new technology,
q^ patients are treated with the new technology at marginal cost θ, and ðq q^Þ
patients are treated under the old technology with marginal cost c. Financial
results are assessed by the hospital with a utility function V. This valuation of
financial results corresponds to the first line of equation [4].
The other element of the utility function of the hospital is made up of
benefits to patients. These are b^ and b in the event of treatment under the
new and old technology respectively. When realized demand is below the
capacity level of the new technology, then utility b^q is generated for each
level of realized demand. In the case of realized demand above the capacity
level for the new technology, q^ patients have utility b^ and ðq q^Þ patients have
utility b. The expected utility over all possible levels of realized demand is the
second line of equation [4]. Note also that in the computation on the expected
utility we are summing over probabilities, not over patients. Finally, we assume
that provider’s altruism translates in a higher weight on patients’ welfare than in
the financial results.
The (adoption) decision problem of the hospital is to choose the level q^ of
patients to be treated under the new technology. Naturally, such decision is
contingent on the system of reimbursement to the hospital.6 We will study and
compare a mixed cost reimbursement system and a DRG payment system.7
Note that the question that we tackle is not the design of an optimal
payment system to incentivate adoption, but the study the impact of some
popular reimbursement systems (see Mossialos and Le Grand 1999) on the
level of adoption of new technology.
To clarify the intuition behind some of the results, we illustrate their content
with a restricted version of the model characterized by risk-neutrality and a
uniform distribution f ðqÞ ¼ 1. These are referred to in the text as remarks.
An assumption maintained throughout the analysis is the fact that the new
technology does not convey any demand expansion. It is often argued that new
6 Abbey (2009) presents a general appraisal of health care payment systems. See also Culyer
and Newhouse (2000).
7 A unified treatment encompassing all the payment systems studied would add elegance to
the analysis and would show explicitly the trade-offs among them. However, the addition of the
extra set of parameters required would seriously interfere the study and comparison of results.
Accordingly, we have opted for a separate analysis sacrificing analytical elegance.
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technologies generate new protocols and treatments that can be applied to
patients already under treatment but also opens the possibility to treat other
patients for which the previous technology was not well-suited. In terms of our
model, we can accommodate this feature by assuming that the old technology
can treat a maximum of qm patients, and the new technology allows to provide
treatment to a maximum of qM > qm patients. Therefore we would have a popu-
lation of two groups of patients where ðqM  qmÞ would denote the increased
demand induced by the new technology. Let us assume that the level of benefits
to patients able to be treated with either technology is b and the benefits to
patients only suited for the new technology is b. Then we can redefine patients’
benefits as b ¼ τbþ ð1 τÞb and the analysis goes through integrating over qM
instead of qm.
3 Technology adoption under mixed cost
reimbursement
Let us assume that the hospital is reimbursed according to the cost of treating
patients. We want to characterize the optimal choice of q^ by the hospital
decision maker, taken as given the payment system.
The total cost depends on the level of realized demand and is defined as the
fixed cost of investment in the new technology (pq^) and the variable cost given
by the population of patients treated. We have to distinguish two situations
according to whether or not realized demand is in excess of the capacity provided
by the new technology (q^). Whenever the installed capacity of the new technol-
ogy allows to treat all patients (q^ ¼ q), then we say that full adoption occurs.
Recall that we assume that the new technology is used until capacity is
exhausted. If there is demand left to serve, patients are treated with the old
technology. Formally, the total cost function of the hospital is given by eq. [1].
We propose a mixed cost reimbursement system flexible enough to accom-
modate a total cost reimbursement, a partial cost reimbursement, and a fixed
fee/capitation payment system. The system is described by (Ellis and McGuire
1986):
R ¼ αþ βTC ½5
where TC stands for total cost and α  0 and β 2 ½0; 1 are parameters allowing
for different variations of the payment system. In particular, if β ¼ 0, we obtain
a capitation system where only a fixed amount is transferred to the hospital
regardless of the costs actually borne with treatment of patients; if α ¼ 0 and
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β ¼ 1 we obtain a full reimbursement system; if α ¼ 0 and β 2 ð0; 1Þ we obtain a
partial reimbursement system; finally, if α >0 and β 2 ð0; 1Þ, we obtain a mixed
payment system with a prospective component and a retrospective element.
To keep the model as simple as possible we do not introduce an explicit
participation constraint for the provider. In turn, this implies that we assume
that R will always suffice to guarantee a non-negative surplus for the provider.
In other words, we implicitly assume that the regulator selects ðα; βÞ-values so
that the adoption of technology when it occurs does not generate losses to the
provider.
Substituting eqs [5] into [4] the hospital’s utility function becomes
U ¼ b^η
ðq^
0
qf ðqÞdqþ η
ðqm
q^
ððq q^Þbþ q^b^Þf ðqÞdq
þ
ðq^
0
Vðα ð1 βÞðpq^þ θqÞÞf ðqÞdq
þ
ðqm
q^
Vðα ð1 βÞðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^ÞÞÞf ðqÞdq
½6
The problem of the hospital is to identify the value of q^ maximizing eq. [6]. To
ease the reading of the mathematical expressions, let us introduce the following
notation:
ηΔ; ηðb^ bÞ
R1ðqÞ; α ð1 βÞðpq^þ θqÞ
R2ðqÞ; α ð1 βÞðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^ÞÞ
In words, R1ðqÞ denotes the net revenues of the hospital when the realized
demand does not exhaust the capacity of the new technology (q< q^), and idle
capacity of the new technology exists; and R2ðqÞ denotes the net revenues of the
hospital when the realized demand exceeds the capacity of the new technology
(q > q^), and some of patients are treated with the old technology.
Proposition 1 Under a mixed cost reimbursement system, full adoption is never
optimal (utility-maximizing) for the provider. Patients’ benefits above a threshold
ensure positive adoption for every level of reimbursement the payment system may
define.
Proof. The optimal level of adoption q^ is the solution of first-order condition of
the optimization problem [6]. That is, the solution of,
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@U
@q^
¼ ηΔ
ðqm
q^
f ðqÞdq ð1 βÞp
ðq^
0
V 0ðR1ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq
 ð1 βÞðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR2ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq ¼ 0:
½7
Note that for q^ ! qm, the first-order condition [7] is negative. Therefore, the
value q^ solving eq. [7] must be below qm. Next, take q^ ¼ 0. Then,
ηΔ ð1 βÞðpþ θ  cÞ Ð qm0 V 0ðR2ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq>0 for β sufficiently high. Or equiva-
lently, for each ηΔ there is a critical β such that q^ >0.
Looking at the second order condition, after noting that R1ðq^Þ ¼ R2ðq^Þ, it is
satisfied if
ηΔ ð1 βÞV 0ðRðq^ÞÞðθ  cÞ>0: ½8
Given that by construction η >0 (altruistic provider) and Δ >0 (incremental
patients’ benefits of the new technology), it follows that we require a value of
β large enough, i.e. sufficiently large cost sharing component in the reimburse-
ment system.
Remark 1 Positive patients’ benefits are a necessary condition for adoption given
the assumption of no cost savings in treatment with the new technology and both
technologies being reimbursed in the same way (βÞ.
To gain insight into the content of this proposition note that the first term in eq.
[7] represents the marginal gain from treating one additional patient with the
new technology when the realized demand is greater than q^. The other terms
represent the marginal cost of treating an extra patient with the new technology.
To obtain an explicit solution to the optimal level of technology adoption, some
further assumptions are required.
Assume now risk neutrality (V 0ðÞ ¼ 1),8 and a uniform distribution for the
number of patients treated by the hospital in the relevant time period. Also
normalize q ¼ 1 without loss of generality. Then, the first-order condition [7]
reduces to
ηΔð1 q^Þ  ð1 βÞpq^ ð1 βÞðpþ θ  cÞð1 q^Þ ¼ 0;
or
q^cr ¼ 1 pð1 βÞ
ηΔ ð1 βÞðθ  cÞ : ½9
8 As we commented previously, this means that the marginal valuation of the financial results
of the provider are independent of its level of activity. In other words, regardless of the
realization of demand, the contribution of profits to the provider’s utility is constant.
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The second-order condition guarantees that the denominator of the fraction is
positive.
Note that we cannot state whether, or not, passing a health technology
assessment criterion (assumption 2) is restrictive over the desired adoption
level by health care providers. To see it, rewrite eq. [9] as,
ð1 q^crÞ½ηΔ ðpþ θ  cÞ  ð1 βÞpq^cr þ βð1 q^crÞðpþ θ  cÞ ¼ 0:
The sign of the first term is given by assumption 2. If it is satisfied is positive,
otherwise is non-positive. The second term is negative, and the last term is
positive. Therefore, it may well be that for certain constellations of parameters,
the optimal adoption level is achieved even without satisfying assumption 2. In
other words, assumption 2 is sufficient but not necessary for adoption. Thus
imposing that it must hold by law will clash in some cases with the decision of
the semi-altruistic provider. For β ¼ 1, full adoption occurs, as one would expect.
Under risk neutrality, uniform distribution, and η> 1, the use of economic
evaluation criteria conveys a higher level of adoption, as long as β< 1, in the
sense that rewriting the numerator of eq. [9] as ηΔ ð1 βÞðpþ θ  cÞ, this
expression is larger than the corresponding in assumption 2.
Note that the assumption η > 1 is only used as sufficient condition in com-
paring the level of adoption, not in the adoption decision per se. Two comments
are in order regarding this assumption. One is technical. Having weight 1 for
profits and η for patients can be rewritten in any suitable way with an appro-
priate transformation. For example, let d; η=ð1þ ηÞ< 1. Then, by dividing the
both weights by 1=ð1þ ηÞ we obtain weight 1 d for profits and d for patients.
The second relates to η> 1 is commonly used in the literature. Just with illus-
trative purposes, see Godager, Iversen, and Ma (2015) and Liu and Ma (2013).
Remark 2 Interestingly enough, the usual cost–benefit rule does not capture the
mechanism through which payments systems induce adoption.
We introduced the cost–benefit assessment rule in assumption 2. It can be
rewritten as
Δ p ðθ  cÞ>0
On the other hand, the rule governing the optimal level of adoption is given by
eq. [8], that can be rewritten as
Δ κðθ  cÞ>0
where κ; 1βη V
0ðRðq^ÞÞ. Thus, cost–benefit analysis does not substitute for a
proper analysis of incentives to adopt a new technology.
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3.1 Cost-sharing and optimal technology adoption
We are interested in assessing how adoption changes with the level of
mixed cost reimbursement. In other words, we want to study the impacts of a
variation of β and α on the level of adoption. This will give us the intuition of
the role of the parameters of the payment system (α and β) in determining the
optimal (utility-maximizing for the provider) level of technology adoption.
Technically, we want to compute the sign of dq^=dβ and of dq^=dα, where q^
is given by the solution of eq. [7]. Thus, we capture the impact of a variation of
β and α on the level of adoption q^ by computing @2U=@q^@β and @2U=@q^@β.
Let us thus compute,
@2U
@q^@β
¼ p
ðq^
0
V 0ðR1ðqÞÞf ðqÞdqþ ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR2ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq
 ð1 βÞ p
ðq^
0
V 00ðR1ðqÞÞðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdq
"
þðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 00ðR2ðqÞÞðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq

½10
Recall that we have assumed a concave utility function V, that is V 00 <0. Also,
assumption 1 tells us that pþ θ  c>0. Thus, it follows that the sign of eq. [10] is
positive, and so is the expression of dq^=dβ. In other words, increasing cost
sharing leads to more adoption, because a higher fraction of the cost is auto-
matically covered.
In a similar fashion, we study the impact of a variation of α by computing,
@2U
@q^@α
¼ ð1 βÞ p
ðq^
0
V 00ðR1ðqÞÞf ðqÞdqþ ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 00ðR2ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq
 !
½11
Given the concavity of VðÞ and using eq. [2], it follows that this expression is
positive. As before, the sign of dq^=dα is the same as the sign of expression [11].
Hence, higher values of α mean lower marginal cost of investing more in terms
of utility. Thus, for the same benefit more investment will result. A particular
case occurs under risk neutrality.
Remark 3 Under risk neutrality, the level of technology adoption is insensitive to α.
Therefore, the only instrument of the payment system to affect technology adoption
is the share of mixed cost reimbursement.
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Given that α monetary units are transferred regardless of the activity of the
hospital, under risk neutrality it should not be surprising that the level of
technology adoption will be linked exclusively to the (expected) number of
patients treated with the new technology, as it is the only way to improve the
utility obtained by the hospital.
3.2 Technological adoption under an exogenous budget
The previous comparative statics exercise says that in general, higher transfers
lead to higher levels of technology adoption by the hospital, because the
increased patients’ benefits offset the increased marginal cost (assumption 2).
A full analysis of the impact of the adoption of the new technology requires the
definition of a reference point, or of a common threshold. In our case, it is not
obvious how to define either of them. Accordingly, we propose two alternatives.
One consists in assuming a given budget on the level of adoption; the alternative
assumes that the hospital’s expected surplus is constant. In this way, we have a
well-defined reference point to evaluate the consequences of technological
adoption. We consider first the case where the budget to invest in the adoption
of the new technology is given.
Consider keeping payment constant in expected terms, that is, dR ¼ 0.
Recalling eqs [1] and [5], the expression of the monetary transfer to the hospital
is given by,
R ¼ αþ β
ðq^
0
ðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
ðpq^þ θqþ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
 !
;
To assess the impact on the level of adoption, besides adjusting the parameters
ðα; βÞ of the payment function to maintain payment constant, dR ¼ 0, we also
need to look at the adjustment of ðα; βÞ in the first-order condition [7] character-
izing the optimal value of q^. The detailed computation of this system of equa-
tions is to be found in Appendix A. To obtain some clear intuition of its content
let us assuming risk neutrality. Then,
Remark 4 Under risk neutrality, moving to more mixed cost reimbursement always
increases adoption, even if (expected) payment is kept constant overall. Risk
aversion leads to ambiguity of how the level of adoption adjusts to changes in
the payment system.
We can examine the ambiguity induced by the presence of risk aversion. The
solution of the system [38] is given by (see Appendix B),
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dq^
dβ
¼ ¡ ΛΦ
Ψþ ΓΦ and
dq^
dα
¼  ¡ ΛΦ
ΛΨþ Γ¡ ½12
Note that the numerators in eq. [12] have an ambiguous sign. They are positive
iff ¡Φ >Λ, where risk aversion appears only in the terms of the fraction. Therefore,
an increase in the cost sharing (β) will induce more adoption if the properties of
the utility function VðÞ are such that the ratio ¡=Φ is above the threshold given
by Λ. The properties of the utility function Vð) will vary across hospitals,
because different providers will have different levels of activity, that is their
values of V 0 and V 00 will differ and so will the expressions in eq. [12]. Therefore,
identifying them is an empirical exercise. This is precisely the issue behind the
difficulties to interpret the empirical work on technological adoption as a func-
tion of the payment system.
To assess the impact on hospital utility, while maintaining dR ¼ 0, let us
compute
dU ¼ @U
@R
dRþ @U
@q^
dq^ ½13
The first term of eq. [13] is zero because we are evaluating the impact on hospital
utility at dR ¼ 0. The second term is also zero from the envelope theorem.
Accordingly, dW ¼ 0.
The intuition under risk aversion follows the same lines of reasoning as
before. The hospital only improves its utility through patients’ benefits. Then,
any increase in the cost sharing favors adoption because the new technology
improves patients’ benefits. Given that total payment remains constant, the
increase in cost sharing is adjusted through a lower α to satisfy the restriction,
thus offsetting the gain of utility.
Remark 5 Keeping the expected payment constant implies no change in the objective
function when changing the parameters of the mixed cost reimbursement system.
Remark 4 and remark 5 together tell us that a move toward more reimbursement
leads to more adoption. Thus, the extra benefits to patients are compensated
with a lower surplus for the hospital to maintain the objective function constant.
3.3 Constant hospital surplus
A potential alternative to fixing the level of expenditure of the health care
system, we could envisage a set-up where the expected surplus of the hospital
is kept constant. Denote such surplus as S. It is defined as,
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S ¼ α ð1 βÞ
ðq^
0
ðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
ðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^Þf ðqÞdq
 !
: ½14
Similarly as in the previous case, we have a system of two equations given by
the adjustment of parameters ðα; βÞ to maintain surplus constant dS ¼ 0 and the
adjustment of ðα; βÞ in the first-order condition [7] characterizing the optimal
value of q^ (see Appendix C). As before let us assume risk neutrality. The
following remark summarizes the main intuitions.
Remark 6 Under risk neutrality and constant trade-off of surplus against patient
benefits, an increase in the mixed cost reimbursement adjusted in a way that total
expected surplus of the hospital remains constant, results in an increase in the
objective function. This results from patients’ benefits due to more adoption given
the absence of costs to raising money for the payment to be made.
4 Technology adoption under DRG payment
Consider a health care system where the provision of services is reimbursed
using a DRG catalog. A DRG payment system means that a fixed amount is paid
for every type of disease. We are considering a single-disease model, where two
technologies are available. We will distinguish two cases. The first one consists
in paying the hospital the same amount regardless of the technology used. We
term it as homogenous DRG reimbursement. It corresponds to a situation where
each patient treated is an episode originating a payment through a given DRG
and technology adoption will keep the DRG. Hence the payment received by the
hospital remains constant. In the second case the level of reimbursement is
conditional upon the choice of technology to provide treatment. It is interpreted
as a situation where adoption of technology leads to the coding of the sickness
episode in a different DRG, receiving a different payment. In this sense we refer
to it as heterogeneous DRG reimbursement. As before, we assume that R will
always suffice to guarantee a non-negative surplus for the provider.
4.1 Homogeneous DRG reimbursement
Let us consider first that the adoption of a new technology does not convey a
variation in the DRG classification. Then, the payment received by the hospital
for patients treated is defined as,
R ¼ Kq: ½15
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Substituting eqs [15] into [4] the hospital’s utility function becomes,
U ¼ η
ðq^
0
b^qf ðqÞdqþ η
ðqm
q^
ððq q^Þbþ q^b^Þf ðqÞdq
þ
ðq^
0
VðKq pq^ θqÞf ðqÞdq
þ
ðqm
q^
VðKq pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
½16
Let us define the net revenues obtained when the new technology can cover all
the demand (R3ðqÞ), and when there is excess demand so that a fraction of the
patients are treated with the old technology (R4ðqÞ) as,
R3ðqÞ;Kq pq^ θq
R4ðqÞ;Kq pq^ θq^ cðq q^Þ
Proposition 2 Under homogeneous DRG payment system, full adoption is never
optimal.
Proof. The optimal level of adoption is given as before, by the solution of the
first-order condition,
@U
@q^
¼ ηΔ
ðqm
q^
f ðqÞdqþ ðVðR3ðq^ÞÞ  VðR4ðq^ÞÞÞf ðq^Þ
 p
ðq^
0
V 0ðR3ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR4ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq ¼ 0:
½17
For q^ ! qm, the first-order condition [17] is negative. Thus, the optimal value
satisfying eq. [17] must be less than qm.
Remark 7 Note that sufficiently large patients’ benefits are necessary for the first-
order condition [17] to have an interior solution. Otherwise, the hospital optimally
does not adopt the new technology.
Let us consider a simplified version of the model by assuming risk neutrality, a
uniform distribution for the number of patients, and without loss of generality
qm ¼ 1. Then, the first-order condition [17] reduces to,
ηΔð1 q^Þ  pq^ ðpþ θ  cÞð1 q^Þ ¼ 0 ½18
This simplified version of the model allows us to obtain an explicit solution of
the optimal level of technical adoption. It is given by,
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q^ ¼ 1 p
ηΔ θ þ c : ½19
The denominator of eq. [19] is positive from the second-order condition. Thus,
q^< 1, and full adoption is never optimal. The optimal value of adoption given by
eq. [19] trades off patients’ benefits and the differential marginal cost of the two
technologies.
Note that under homogenous DRG payment systems, adoption by the health
care provider occurs (i.e. q^ >0) if and only if the economic evaluation criterion is
satisfied (compare eq. [19] with Assumption 2).
Remark 8 Note that q^ is independent of the price K. In other words, the price does
not matter for the adoption decision. This is so because, given that the hospital
receives the same payment for the patients regardless of the technology used, the
adoption decision is driven by a cost-minimization rule (given Δ large enough).
Next, we look at the comparative statics analysis of the impact of the level of
reimbursement K on adoption. It follows from,
@2U
@q^@K
¼ p
ðq^
0
V 00ðR3ðqÞÞqf ðqÞdq ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 00ðR4ðqÞÞqf ðqÞdq>0
Given the concavity of VðÞ and recalling that pþ θ  c>0, it follows that this
derivative is positive. Therefore, higher DRG payment means that in utility terms
there is lower marginal cost of investment, and thus there is more investment in
capacity.
Remark 9 Risk aversion is a necessary condition for the DRG payment being able
to affect the level of adoption.
4.2 Heterogeneous DRG reimbursement
Assume now that the hospital is reimbursed conditionally upon the technology
used in the treatments. This makes sense as long as the costs of the new and old
technologies are sufficiently disperse so that each treatment falls in a different
DRG, which typically elicits a different payment. With this framework in mind,
let us define
R5ðqÞ;K1q pq^ θq
R6ðqÞ;K1q^þ K2ðq q^Þ  pq^ θq^ cðq q^Þ
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where K1 is the payment associated with treating a patient with the new technology
and K2 is the payment associated with treating a patient with the old technology.
Now the utility function of the hospital is given by,
U ¼ η
ðq^
0
b^qf ðqÞdqþ η
ðqm
q^
ððq q^Þbþ q^b^Þf ðqÞdq
þ
ðq^
0
VðR5ðqÞÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
VðR6ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq
½20
Proposition 3 Under a heterogeneous DRG payment system, full adoption is never
optimal.
Proof. The first-order condition characterizing the optimal level of adoption is
@U
@q^
¼ ηΔ
ðqm
q^
f ðqÞdqþ VðR5ðq^ÞÞf ðq^Þ  VðR6ðq^ÞÞf ðq^Þ
 p
ðq^
0
V 0ðR5ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq
þ ðK1  K2  p θ þ cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR6ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq ¼ 0:
½21
For q^ ! qm, the first-order condition [21] is negative. Thus, the optimal value
satisfying eq. [17] must be less than qm.
Remark 10 Note that in contrast with the case of homogenous DRG, now patients’
benefits may not be necessary for adoption to occur if the margin the hospital
obtains with the new technology, (K1  p θ), is larger than the margin that it
obtains with the old technology, (K2  c). In other words, the adoption decision is
driven by the difference in reimbursement between the two technologies. Formally,
if K1  K2  ðpþ θ  cÞ>0, then we can identify a constellation of parameters
guaranteeing and interior solution, even without patients’ benefits.
To gain some intuition of the level of adoption, assume risk neutrality, and a
uniform distribution once again. Also, normalize qm ¼ 1 without loss of general-
ity. Then, expression [21] reduces to,
ηΔð1 q^Þ  pq^þ ðK1  K2  p θ þ cÞð1 q^Þ ¼ 0;
so that,
q^ ¼ 1 p
ηΔþ K1  K2  θ þ c : ½22
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and second-order conditions guarantee that the denominator of the fraction is
positive. Note that q^< 1. The optimal value of q^ given by eq. [22] reflects the
trade-off between incurring an idle capacity cost for high q^ and getting a better
margin, i.e. K1  ðpþ θÞ>K2  c. Furthermore, the benefits of the patients are
not a necessary condition for technology adoption as long as the new technol-
ogy leads to a higher margin from payment. Adding patients’ benefits naturally
raises adoption rates.
In this case, technology adoption by the health care provider will always be
greater than implied by application of the health technology assessment. That is,
in cases where economic evaluation indicates no adoption of the new technol-
ogy (Δ< pþ θ  c), the health care provider will still prefer a strictly positive
level of technology adoption for high enough differential reimbursement of the
two technologies.
Summarizing we have obtained that assuming the hospital obtains a higher
margin with the new technology than with the old one, is a sufficient condition
for adoption (because the new technology produces no harm). However, it is not
necessary. In particular, we will observe adoption when such assumption does
not hold but patients’ benefits are large enough. In other words, patients’
benefits are a necessary condition for adoption but not sufficient.
5 Comparing payment regimes
We have presented the adoption decision under two payment regimes, mixed
cost reimbursement, and DRG payments. The respective optimal levels are
difficult to compare. The very particular scenario of risk neutrality (under the
form of V 0ðÞ ¼ 1) and uniform distribution allows us to obtain some intuition on
the relative impact of each of the payment systems on the level of adoption.
Let us recall the expressions for the respective levels of adoption under
mixed cost reimbursement and DRG payment systems, given by eqs [9], [19] and
[22] respectively, and let λ;K1  K2:
q^cr ¼ 1 pð1 βÞ
ηΔ ð1 βÞðθ  cÞ ; ½23
q^hom ¼ 1 p
ηΔ ðθ  cÞ ; ½24
q^het ¼ 1 p
ηΔþ λ ðθ  cÞ ; ½25
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where the superscripts cr, hom and het refer to the mixed cost reimbursement,
homogeneous DGR, and heterogeneous DRG respectively. Direct comparison of
the difference in adoption levels yields:
q^hom  q^het <0; ½26
q^cr  q^het 7 0; ½27
q^cr  q^hom >0 ½28
Comparison between the adoption levels across DRG regimes is clear cut. Under
heterogeneous DRG reimbursement the optimal level of technical adoption is
greater than under homogeneous DRG reimbursement. This is not surprising.
The hospital has more incentive to invest in the new technology when the
payment associated with it is larger than the payment for the old technology.
To interpret expression [27], suppose the provider decides to invest an
amount p in the new technology under the DRG system. Such investment allows
to treat one extra patient with the new technology. The benefits to the provider
in our setting under additive utility and risk neutrality, are the gain in patients’
benefits (Δ), plus the extra revenues associated with the new technology
(K1  K2), minus the marginal cost increase of treating one extra patient with
the new technology (θ  c). Summarizing the net gains to the provider of treat-
ing an additional patient with the new technology under a heterogeneous DRG
reimbursement scheme are ηΔþ K1  K2  ðθ  cÞ. This is the denominator of
the left-hand fraction in eq. [27].
Consider now the same investment under the mixed cost reimbursement
payment system. Since the provider knows that it will obtain a reimbursement β,
from its perspective spending p from its free financial resources yields 1=ð1 βÞ
patients to be treated with the new technology. Each of these additional patients
generate benefits (Δ), and an operating marginal cost change of ð1 βÞðθ  cÞ.
We can summarize this argument saying that the investment of p monetary units
results in a return of ðηΔ ð1 βÞðθ  cÞÞ=ð1 βÞ. This corresponds to the
denominator of the right-hand fraction in eq. [27].
We represent this comparison in Figure 1. The dividing line represents the
locus of ðλ; βÞ values yielding the same marginal return of investment in the new
technology to the provider across regimes. The areas to the right and left of this
line indicate the parameter configurations yielding more technology adoption
under the payment scheme generating higher marginal net benefits to the provider.
Note that as the new technology embodies higher patients’ benefits com-
pared to the old one, the constellation of ðλ; βÞ-values for which providers are
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willing to adopt under mixed cost reimbursement increases. This is a direct
consequence of the retrospective character of the mixed cost reimbursement
scheme. However, no clear-cut comparison on the level of reimbursement
along the indifference line can be obtained. This is because such comparison
involves comparing the values of K2; α; and β that are not directly related.
A similar argument can be put forward to analyze expression [28]. The net gains
to the provider of an additional unit of the new technology under a homogenous
DRG reimbursement scheme are ηΔ ðθ  cÞ. This is the denominator of the left-
hand fraction in eq. [28]. Under mixed cost reimbursement, the investment of p
monetary units results in a return of ð1=1 βÞðηΔ ð1 βÞðθ  cÞÞ. This corre-
sponds to the denominator of the right-hand fraction in eq. [28]. The return of the
investment is thus larger under mixed cost reimbursement, yielding the higher level
of adoption.
6 Welfare analysis
So far we have identified the levels of technology adoption under different
reimbursement rules and we have compared them as well, under some particu-
lar conditions. To complete the analysis we need to assess whether these
10
Figure 1: Optimal adoption: CR vs heterogeneous DRG
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payment rules induce over-adoption or under-adoption with respect to the first-
best associated with the social welfare.
For our purpose, we define the social welfare, in line with Levaggi, Moretto,
and Pertile (2010)) and the literature in general, as the difference between
benefits and costs. To obtain explicit solutions and compare them with the
corresponding adoption levels in eqs [23], [24] and [25], we shall assume again
risk neutrality and a uniform distribution and also normalize qm ¼ 1. Then,
SWðq^Þ ¼
ðq^
0
b^qf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
ððq q^Þbþ q^b^Þf ðqÞdq

ðq^
0
ðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdq
ðqm
q^
ðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq EðRjÞ
½29
where  represents the social cost of public funds à la Laffont and Tirole (1986)9
and EðRjÞ denote expected revenues under reimbursement rule j.
The expected revenues under the different reimbursements rules are given by
EðRcrÞ ¼ αþ β
ðq^
0
ðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
ðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
" #
½30
EðRhomÞ ¼
ðqm
0
Kqf ðqÞdq ¼ KEðqÞ ½31
EðRhetÞ ¼
ðq^
0
K1qf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
ðK1q^þ K2ðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq ½32
6.1 Mixed cost reimbursement rule
After substituting eqs [30] into [29] we compute the first-order condition:
@SW
@q^
¼ ðΔ ðpþ θ  cÞÞð1 q^Þ  pq^ βðpþ ðθ  cÞð1 qÞÞ ¼ 0:
Solving for q^ we obtain,
q^swcr ¼ 1 pð1þ βÞ
Δ ð1þ βÞðθ  cÞ : ½33
9 See Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for a survey on the theory of regulation.
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This is the welfare maximizing level of adoption under the mixed cost reimbur-
sement rule. We want to compare this level of adoption q^swcr with the corre-
sponding level of adoption that maximizes provider’s utility, namely q^cr.
A direct comparison of eqs [23] and [33] yields
q^cr  q^swcr ¼ pð1þ βÞ
Δ ð1þ βÞðθ  cÞ 
pð1 βÞ
ηΔ ð1 βÞðθ  cÞ >0:
Accordingly, under mixed cost reimbursement the provider over-adopts the new
technology with respect to a welfare maximizing policy. The intuition behind the
result comes from the fact that the provider does not bear the full cost of the
adoption.
6.2 Homogeneous DRG reimbursement rule
Substituting eqs [31] into [29] we compute the first-order condition,
@SW
@q^
¼ ðΔ ðpþ θ  cÞÞð1 q^Þ  pq^ ¼ 0:
Solving for q^ we obtain,
q^swhom ¼ 1 p
Δ ðθ  cÞ : ½34
Now, comparing eqs [24] and [34] we obtain
q^hom  q^swhom  0:
That is for η> 1, the provider over-adopts the new technology because patients
are reimbursed at the same rate but patients’ benefits are larger under the new
technology. However, when η ¼ 1, the level of adoption is optimal. This is so
because given that both technologies are reimbursed at the same price, K, such
price is irrelevant in the adoption decision. Recall, that η ¼ 1 means that the
semi-altruistic provider weights equally patients’ benefits and its financial
results.
6.3 Heterogeneous DRG reimbursement rule
Substituting eqs [32] into [29] we compute the first-order condition,
@SW
@q^
¼ ðΔ ðpþ θ  cÞÞð1 q^Þ  pq^ λð1 q^Þ ¼ 0
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Solving for q^ we obtain,
q^swhet ¼ 1 p
Δ ðθ  cÞ  λ ½35
A direct comparison of eqs [25] and [35] yields
q^het  q^swhet >0:
Again, as under mixed cost reimbursement, the provider over-adopts the new
technology. The intuition now relies in the fact that the new technology has a
higher reimbursement thus providing the incentives to over-invest in the new
technology.
Note that the same (qualitative) results are obtained if we do not consider
the social cost of public funds ( ¼ 0) following the approach à la Baron and
Myerson (1982).
7 Final remarks
Adoption of new technologies is usually considered a main driver of growth of
health care costs.10 Arguments in favor of cost–benefit analysis (health technol-
ogy assessment) before the introduction of new technologies has made its way
into policy. We now observe in many countries the requirement of an “economic
test” before payment for new technologies is accepted by third-party payers
(either public or private). This is especially visible in the case of new pharma-
ceutical products and it has a growing trend in medical devices.
However, there is a paucity of theoretical work related to the determinants
of adoption and diffusion of new technologies. We contribute toward filling
this gap.
The novelty of our approach consists in allowing for an integrated treatment
of payment systems and the incentives they create for adoption of new technol-
ogy under demand uncertainty. We identify conditions for adoption under two
common different payment systems. Also, we compare technology adoption
across reimbursement systems in a simplified set-up. We now summarize the
main results.
Under a mixed cost reimbursement system, large enough patient benefits
are required for adoption to occur. As long as patient benefits are above a
certain threshold, adoption of the new technology always occurs at strictly
positive levels. However, it is never optimal to expand the level of adoption to
10 See Smith, Newhouse, and Freeland (2009) for a recent account.
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cover all demand (full adoption). The threshold is given, in the case of risk
neutrality and uniform distribution for patient benefits, by the cost of treating a
patient under the new technology accounting for the savings resulting from not
treating him under the old technology. The mixed cost reimbursement allows for
the extreme cases of full mixed cost reimbursement and capitation (a fixed fee is
paid, regardless of actual costs).
The other payment system we have considered is prospective payments on a
sickness episode basis (the DRG system). Two different regimes can be envi-
saged regarding the impact of using a new technology in the payment received
by the provider. In the first one, the treatment performed with the new technol-
ogy is classified into the same DRG (and payment made by the third-party payer)
as the old technology. The second possibility is that the new technology leads to
a payment in a different DRG. When the DRG is not adjusted by the use of a new
technology, patients’ benefits are necessary to induce adoption. Whenever the
DRG for payment of the new technology has a higher price, adoption may occur
even in the absence of patients’ benefits. However in that case, the margin
gained with the new DRG associated with treatment must be sufficiently high
to compensate the cost of adoption. As in the case of mixed cost reimbursement,
full adoption is not optimal either with prospective reimbursements schemes,
regardless of whether the reimbursement rate differs or not between the new and
the old technology.
The role of patient benefits is a crucial one. The desired levels of technology
adoption of health care providers can be compared with the implications of
requiring technology adoption to pass a health technology assessment (incre-
mental benefit above incremental cost). Except for the case of a new technology
being paid in the same DRG of the old technology, private adoption levels are
always higher than allowed by this criterion. This holds the testable prediction
that health care providers will always find, in the other payment systems,
regulation imposing health technology assessments to be actively constraining
their decisions. Thus, they will voice the complaint that regulation reduces their
desired level of adoption.
Under parameters for the payment systems in which adoption always
occurs, mixed cost reimbursement leads to greater adoption of the new technol-
ogy if the rate of reimbursement is high relative to the margin of new vs old
technology under DRG. A larger patient benefit favors more adoption under the
mixed cost reimbursement payment system, provided adoption occurs initially
under both payment systems (i.e. in the case of uniform distribution of demand
and risk neutrality, when patient benefits from the new technology are positive).
To evaluate the impact of technology adoption we keep fixed the level of
total expenditure of the health system and study the impact on adoption of
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adjustments in the parameters of the payment function. Under risk neutrality the
result is clear-cut: more mixed cost reimbursement induces more adoption.
However, results are ambiguous under risk aversion. Thus, in policy terms,
our analysis also vindicates the virtues (under sufficiently large difference
between the DRGs of the competing technologies) of retrospective payment
systems as a driver toward adoption of a new technology after a decade where
the debate between cost containment versus quality issues has favored prospec-
tive reimbursement over mixed cost reimbursement. A full assessment of this
issue would require an investigation of the optimal definition of policy para-
meters within each reimbursement scheme. This is left for future research. Also,
we compare adoption levels under the different reimbursement rules to its first-
best level. We find that under homogeneous DRG reimbursement, given that
both technologies are reimbursed at the same price the provider’s decision is
driven by cost minimization concerns allowing to adopt optimally. Under the
other rules the provider always over-invests in the new technology although for
different reasons. Under mixed cost reimbursement the cost sharing between
provider and payer induces the former with incentives to adopt the new tech-
nology beyond the optimal level. Under heterogeneous DRG reimbursement it is
the price difference.
In our analysis we assume that the new technology does not convey any
demand expansion. We can accommodate the popular argument that new
technologies generate new protocols and treatments that can be applied to
patients already under treatment but also opens the possibility to treat other
patients for which the previous technology was not well-suited. Simply we need
to assume that the old technology can treat a maximum of qm patients, and the
new technology allows to provide treatment to a maximum of qM > qm patients.
Therefore we would have a population of two groups of patients where
ðqM  qmÞ would denote the increased demand induced by the new technology.
Redefining in a suitable way patients’ benefits, the analysis goes through
integrating over qM instead of qm.
We do not explicitly address the issue of uniqueness of the solutions. Our
main concern lies in studying the adoption decision. Should multiple solutions
exist, we would be forced to introduce more structure in the model to implement
a selection criterion. However, qualitatively the intuitions would remain
unaltered.
Our analysis also shows that standard health technology assessment (eco-
nomic evaluation studies) does not capture the channels by which payment
mechanisms may lead to more (or less) adoption.
Our model and results are the first to theoretically address the role of
payment systems in the adoption of new technologies. In contrast with the
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theoretical contributions referenced in the introduction, our analysis does not
look at adoption as the result of the interaction of the health care sector with
other sectors of the economy, but as the strict consequence of the reimburse-
ment system in place. The results obtained are to be used to interpret empirical
evidence that addresses speed of diffusion of new technologies and payment
systems. Some caveats are worth pointing out. First, we take a relationship
between the provider and the third-party payer to take place without influence
from other forces. In particular, there is no role for competition between hospi-
tals in our model. Second, investment in the new technology is perfectly lumpy.
It is done once and it cannot be adjusted further within the same time frame of
uncertain demand. Third, we acknowledge the limitation of the analysis asso-
ciated to not considering how the payment system will affect the number and
type of new technologies available rather than simply whether existing technol-
ogies are adopted. Finally, we also acknowledge the difficulties both for patients
and providers to assess the level of patient benefits. In the same vein, there may
be substantial heterogeneity across patients with respect to the net health
benefits. Both features will blur the distinction between the effect and desir-
ability of one payment system versus another.
The model proposed in the analysis is static because we focus the attention
in the decision of technological adoption. Closely related to adoption we find the
diffusion of technology that is a dynamic phenomenon. Although beyond the
scope of the present analysis, we can link our model to existing literature on
technological diffusion by considering as a reference point the ``epidemic"
model, and assume information on the existence of the new technology follows
a word of mouth diffusion process in which the main source of information is
previous users.11 In this context we can envisage hospitals that have already
adopted the new technology until today and a (probabilistic) mechanism by
which a hospital running the old technology contacts with a hospital that has
adopted the new technology. Then, we propose to link our results on adoption to
the diffusion process assuming that the “infection” is determined by q^. In this
way we would obtain the number of adopters at each moment, so that the way
payment systems influence q^ translates into an impact on the speed of diffusion.
This implication is relevant for empirical works looking at the speed and level of
diffusion of new technologies.
11 This paragraph is purely illustrative. Thus, we neglect both the weaknesses of this approach
and the alternatives proposed to overcome them. See Geroski (2000) for a non-technical
introduction.
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Appendix
Appendix A
A.1 Welfare analysis under an exogenous budget
Assuming that the payment to the hospital remains constant after adjusting the
parameters ðα; βÞ of the payment function, a policy change in parameters will satisfy
dR ¼ dαþ dβ
ðq^
0
ðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
ðpq^þ θqþ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
 !
þ β p
ðq^
0
f ðqÞdqþ ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
f ðqÞdq
 !
dq^ ¼ 0:
½36
Finally, let us recall the first-order condition [7] characterizing the optimal value
of q^. Total differentiation yields
@2W
@q^2
dq^þ
 
p
ðq^
0
V 0ðR1ðqÞÞf ðqÞdqþ ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR2ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq
 ð1 βÞ
 
p
ðq^
0
V 00ðR1ðqÞÞðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdq
2cmþ ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 00ðR2ðqÞÞðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
!
dβ
 ð1 βÞ
 
p
ðq^
0
V 00ðR1ðqÞÞf ðqÞdqþ ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 00ðR2ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq
!
dα ¼ 0
½37
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Thus, we have a system of equations given by eqs [36] and [37], that we can
write in a compact form as
dαþ Γdq^þ Λdβ ¼ 0
ΦdαΨdq^þ ¡dβ ¼ 0:
½38
where we use the following notation:
Γ; β p
ðq^
0
f ðqÞdqþ ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
f ðqÞdq
 !
>0
Λ;
ðq^
0
ðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
ðpq^þ θqþ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq>0
Φ;  ð1 βÞ p
ðq^
0
V 00ðR1ðqÞÞf ðqÞdqþ ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 00ðR2ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq
 !
>0
Ψ;  @
2W
@q^2
>0
¡;p
ðq^
0
V 0ðR1ðqÞÞf ðqÞdqþ ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR2ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq
 ð1 βÞ
 
p
ðq^
0
V 00ðR1ðqÞÞðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdq
þ ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 00ðR2ðqÞÞðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
!
>0
Note that if we assume risk neutrality, the system simplifies to
dαþ Γdq^þ Λdβ ¼ 0 ½39
 bΨdq^þ b¡dβ ¼ 0: ½40
where bΨ and b¡ represent the corresponding values Ψ and ¡ when V 00 ðÞ ¼ 0.
Note that eq. [40] tells us that dq^=dβ >0, and eq. [39] tells us that α adjusts
accordingly to satisfy the equation.
Appendix B
B.1 Technical analysis of Remark 4
The first-order condition for the hospital is given by,
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@W
@q^
¼ f ðq^ÞΔUðbÞ  p
ðq^
0
V 0ðR pq^ θqÞf ðqÞdq
ðpþ θ  cÞ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq ¼ 0:
½41
To obtain the impact of the policy change on technology adoption (that is, on q^),
we totally differentiate eq. [41] with respect to q^; p, and θ, and impose
dθ ¼ λdp, where λ ¼ q^= Ð q^0 qf ðqÞdq.
Total differentiation of the first-order condition yields,
@2W
@q^2
dq^
ðq^
0
V 0ðR pq^ θqÞf ðqÞdq
 !
dp
þ pq^
ðq^
0
V
00 ðR pq^ θqÞf ðqÞdq
 !
dp
þ
 
pq^
ðq^
0
V
00 ðR pq^ θqÞf ðqÞdqθ

 ðqm
q^
V 0ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
!
dp
þ
 
ðpþ θ  cÞq^
ðqm
q^
V
00 ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
!
dp

 ðqm
q^
V 0ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
!
dθ
þ
 
ðpþ θ  cÞq^
ðqm
q^
V
00 ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
!
dθ ¼ 0
½42
Substituting dθ ¼ λdp and collecting terms we can rewrite eq. [42] as
@2W
@q^2
dq^ ¼
" ðq^
0
V 0ðR pq^ θqÞf ðqÞdq
#
dp

"
pq^
ðq^
0
V
00 ðR pq^ θqÞf ðqÞdq p
ðq^
0
V
00 ðR pq^ θqÞqf ðqÞdqλ
#
dp
þ
"
ð1 λÞ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
#
dp
þ
"
ðλ 1Þq^ðpþ θ  cÞq
ðqm
q^
V
00 ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq

dp;
½43
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and further collecting terms, eq. [43] becomes,
@2W
@q^2
dq^ ¼
ðq^
0
V 0ðR pq^ θqÞf ðqÞdq
" #
dp
 pq^
ðq^
0
V
00 ðR pq^ θqÞ 1 qÐ q^
0 qf ðqÞdq
 !
f ðqÞdq
" #
dp
þ ð1 λÞ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
 
dp
þ ðλ 1Þq^ðpþ θ  cÞq^
ðqm
q^
V
00 ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
 
dp
½44
The first two terms in square brackets in the right-hand side are positive, while
the third and fourth terms have negative signs. Therefore the impact on q^ will be
ambiguous.
This can be made clearer in the special case of risk neutrality, that is V 0 ¼ 1
and V
00 ¼ 0. Then hospital decision makers care about expected profits from
hospital activity and patient health gains. Under these assumptions, the right-
hand side of eq. [44] can be rewritten as,ðq^
0
ðR pq^ θqÞf ðqÞdqþ ð1 λÞ
ðqm
q^
ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
¼ R pq^ θ
ðqm
q^
qf ðqÞdq ð1 λÞ
ðqm
q^
cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
 λ
ðqm
q^
ðR pq^ θq^Þf ðqÞdq θ
ðqm
q^
q^f ðqÞdq
¼ R pq^ θ
ðqm
q^
qf ðqÞdqþ ðλ 1Þ
ðqm
q^
cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
 q^Ð q^
0 qf ðqÞdq
ð1 Fðq^ÞÞðR pq^ θq^Þ
¼ ðλ 1Þ
ðqm
q^
cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdqþ ðR pq^Þð1 Fðq^ÞÞλÞ þ θ λq^
ðq^
0
qf ðqÞdq
 !
¼ ðλ 1Þ
ðqm
q^
cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdqþ θðλ2  1Þ
ðq^
0
qf ðqÞdqþðRpq^Þð1 λð1 Fðq^ÞÞÞ:
½45
The first two terms of eq. [45] are positive, whilst the last one is positive if
1 > λð1 Fðq^ÞÞ. This occurs for a high value of q^.
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To better assess the meaning of this result, assume 1 > λð1 Fðq^ÞÞ. Then it
follows that,
dq^
dp
jdEðπÞ¼0 >0:
In this case, a decrease in the price of treating patients with the new technology,
at the cost of increasing the price of consumables does result in a smaller
adoption level (and consequently a lower diffusion rate) of the new technology.
This result holds for a sufficiently high value of q^ in equilibrium.
Also, q^ will be higher when benefits to patients are higher. Thus, for
technologies that would lead to extensive use on patients, the move toward a
lower price p retards diffusion in anticipation of the high costs associated with
consumables.12
To address the welfare effect to the hospital, the impact on the utility of the
decision maker, by application of the envelope theorem, is given by
dW
dp
jdEðπÞ¼0 ¼
ðq^
0
V 0ðR pq^ θqÞ½q^dpþ qλdpf ðqÞdq
þ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞ½q^dpþ q^λdpf ðqÞdq:
½46
Noting that,
V 0ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞ>V 0ðR pq^ θqÞ>V 0ðR pq^Þ;
expression [46] can be rewritten as
V 0ðR pq^Þ
ðq^
0
ðq^þ λqÞf ðqÞdqþ ðλ 1Þ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
¼ V 0ðR pq^Þð1 Fðq^ÞÞq^þ ðλ 1ÞÞ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR pq^ θq^ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq>0;
½47
implying
dW
dp
jdEðπÞ¼0 >0:
Therefore, in general, the subsidization of equipment has a negative impact on a
hospital’s utility due to the extra costs associated with consumables.
12 Note that we are not addressing the optimal pricing policy for the medical equipment
company. This can be seen as the outcome of a previous stage in a larger game.
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Appendix C
C.1 Welfare analysis under constant hospital surplus
Totally differentiating eq. [14] allows us to introduce the restriction of keeping
the hospital surplus constant as,
dS ¼ dα ð1 βÞðpþ ðθ  cÞð1 Fðq^ÞÞÞdq^
þ
ðq^
0
ðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
ðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^Þf ðqÞdq
 !
dβ ¼ 0
½48
As before, we have a system of two equations given by eqs [37] and [48], which
in compact form are
ΦdαΨdq^þ ¡dβ ¼ 0
dαþ Ωdq^þdβ ¼ 0
½49
where we use the following notation:
Ω;  ð1 βÞðpþ ðθ  cÞð1 Fðq^ÞÞÞ
;
ðq^
0
ðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
ðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^Þf ðqÞdq
Imposing risk neutrality to better assess its content, the system [49] simplifies to,
Ψdq^þ ¡0dβ ¼ 0
dαþ Ωdq^þdβ ¼ 0
½50
so that dq^=dβ >0, but the sign of dα=dβ is ambiguous.
Finally, note that
dW ¼
ðq^
0
V 0ðR1ðqÞÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR2ðqÞÞf ðqÞdq
 !
dα
þ
ðq^
0
V 0ðR1ðqÞÞðpq^þ θqÞf ðqÞdqþ
ðqm
q^
V 0ðR2ðqÞÞðpq^þ θq^þ cðq q^ÞÞf ðqÞdq
 !
dβ
½51
Assume under risk neutrality that V 0ðÞ ¼ 1 without loss of generality. Then,
substituting eq. [48] in eq. [51], it follows that dW >0.
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